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On the Causes of, and Circumstances attending, the 
Explosion which occurred at White haven .. William .. 
Pit, Cumberland, on the 15th August, 1947 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HUGH GAITSKElL, C.RE., M.P., 
Minister of Fuel and Power. 
28th April, 1948 
SIR, 
EXPLOSION .\T WHITEHAVEN "WILLIAM" PIT, CUMBERLAND 
I.-INTRODUCTORY 
1. In compliance with the direction of your predecessor in office, the Rt. Hon. 
Emanuel ShinweU, M.P., I have held a Formal Investigation under the provisions 
of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and under the Ministry of Fuel and 
Power Act, 1945, into the causes of, and circumstances attending, the explosion 
at the \;Vhitehaven .. \.villiam" Pit, Cumberland, which occurred on the 
15th August, 1947, causing the loss of 104 lives. 
A list of the persons killed and injured is given in Appendix r. 
2. Being in complete agreement with the unanimous opinion of the mining 
and other experts who gave evidence at the Inquiry, namely, that the explosion 
originated with the firing of a charge of sheathed permitted explosive placed in a 
shot-hole drilled in the roof, and directed towards the waste behind and immedi­
ately contiguous to a longwall face, and being apprehensive of the danger 
portending in other pits in the country where a similar practice existed, [ 
deemed it necessary that the immediate attention of the managements at such 
collieries should be directed to the grave risks attending this practice. 
Accordingly, on the 15th October, 1947, I submitted to you an Interim Report 
in. which I described very briefly the origin, cause and nature of the explosion, 
and made some suggestions and recommendations for the avoidance of a similar 
type of explosion in the future. The Interim Report was presented by you to 
Parliament on the 23rd October, 19-17, and published as Cmd. 7236·. 
3. The Interim Report was well received by the Mining Industry, and served 
its purpose in that it led to inunediate steps being taken at many collieries 
to avert the danger envisaged. I have now the honour to submit my Final 
Report on the explosion. 
4. The Inquiry was held in the Methodist Church Schoolroom, \¥bitehaven, 
from the 7th to the 10th October, 1947. inclusive. A list of the forty-six 
witnesses examined during the proceedings is given in Appendix lI. 
5. The appearances were as follows :-
(a) !llinistry oJ Fuel alld Power: 
Mr. R. ]. Edwards, H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines, and 
Mc. G. D. Nussey, H.M. District Inspector of Mines. 
Dc. H. F. Coward, Director of Safety in Mines Research and Testing 
Branch. 
(b) Natiollal Coal Board: 
Mr. Paul E. Sandlands, K.C., and 
Mc. G. R. Swanwick, instructed by Messrs. Brockbank, Helder &Ormrod, 
\Vhitehaven. 
• H.M.S.O. Id. 
A' 
4 
(c) Natiollal Union of Mineworkers: 
�Ir. Abe Moffat and Mr. ]. R. A. Machen. 
(d) Cumber/and Area of National Union of A1ineworkers : 
1I1r. T. Stephenson, Mr. ]. Martin and Mr. R. Bealtie. 
{e} National Association of Colliery l\rJanagers : 
l\Iajor R. \,V. Anderson and Mc Dean Harrison. 
(j) Natiollal Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies alld Shot-Firers: 
1I1r. B. Walsh, Mr. H. Skerry and Mr. F. Pattinson. 
(g) Association of Mini1lg Electrical and A1echanical Ellgim:ers : 
Mr. S. A. Simon, M.A., and Mr. E. j. IVestcott. 
l l .-PARTICULARS OF THE COLLIERY AND ITS BACKGROUXD 
(a) Gelleral 
6. The " \Villiam" Pit is one of a group of pits sunk near the coast·line 
adjacent to the port and town of Whitehaven in the County of Curnberland. 
The pits in this group were sunk to work the rich seams of under-sea coal 1 
at the southern end of the Cumberland Coalfield. The" \\'illiam " is situated 
on a ledge between the cliffs and the sea, 49 feet above sea level and 400 yards 
north of \Vhitehaven L.M.S. Railway Station. There are two circular shafts. 
The downcast shaft is 12 feet in diameter and is used for the winding of men, 
mineral and other materials. The upcast shaft, 14 feet in diameter, is a second 
means of egress and is not used for winding minera1. Both shafts \.,,-ere sunk 
about the year 1806 to the Six Quarters Seam at a depth of 891 feet. Many 
years ago, however, the lower length of the shafts was abandoned, and \\inding ... 
has since been' carried on from an inset 30 feet below the .Main Band Seam 
which is intersected by the shafts at a depth of 62-1 feet. There is, in addition, 
a third means of egress, by way of a roadv,ray connecting the workings of the 
.. \ViIliam " Pit with the adjoining Haig Pit through the \Vellington Pit, shown 
on Plan No. 1 .  
7. I t  is well to remember that this group of pits a t  \\'hitehaven, including 
the " \\'iJliarn ", has had a somewhat chequered history in recent years in 
respect of ownership and a sombre record of disastrous explosions. In the 
past fifteen years ownership has changed no less than four times. In 1933 
the \\'hitehaven Coal Company, Ltd., solei the pits to Messrs. Priestman 
\Vhitehaven Collieries, Ltd. In 1936, the pits were acquired by the Cumberland 
Coal Company (I\'hitehaven), Ltd. At this time the " Irilliam" had been 
standing idle for two years and was re-opened by the new Owners. \Vith the 
nationalization of the coal mines, the ownership passed to the National Coal 
Board, and the" \ViUiarn" Pit became a unit in the No. 10 or Cumberland Area 
of the Northern Division of the Board. 
S. So far as explosions are concerned, the group has probably the blackest 
record in the annals of coal mining. Since the advent of the present century. 
its record of explosions, involving the loss of ten or more li\'es, is as follow!'> :-
Date 
11th May, 19 10 
5th September, 1922 
12th February, 1928 
29th January, 1931 
3rd June, 19�1 

















9. �or is that all. The" \Villiam " Pit has a considerable history of trouble 
from heatings and fires due to spontaneous combustion. Indeed, the explosion 
in J9-U occurred in connexion with a large sealed off area of workings in the 
Main Band Seam, which had been abandoned in 1928 and in which at some time 
predously there was known to exist an active fire due to spontaneous combustion. 
There is an extensive area of abandoned bord and pillar workings in this 10 feet 
thick :Main Band Seam, in which, although there had been much splitting and 
robbing of the pillars, there had been little" broken" working. In his Report· 
on this explosion, the late Mr. F. H. Wynne, C.B.E., B.5c., stated: .. Having 
regard to the thickness of the seam and the method of working, it is perhaps 
not surprising to find a history of trouble from time to time due to spontaneous 
combustion. Definite colliery records of trouble from this cause are, however, 
somewhat meagre and confined to comparatively recent years." Consideration 
of this present explosion, in  some of its aspects at least, as well as of future 
precautions to be taken at the colliery, cannot be divorced from this background 
of explosions and fires. 
(b) Seams Worked alld M elllod of 11' orkillg 
10. Three of the principal seams, the Bannock Band, the Main Band and the 
Six Quarters, have been more or less extensively worked at the" \.villiam " Pit 
during its long history. As might be expected, the workings in the richest of 
them-the Main Band-are the most extensive. This seam lies about 25 fathoms 
below the Bannock Band and 42 fathoms above the Six Quarters Seam and was 
worked by the bord and pillar method. Largely because of the liability to spon­
taneous combustion which gave rise to heatings and fires which had to be sealed 
off, the seam was abandoned many years ago. From the re-opening of the pit in 
1937 until June, 1941, the output came from longwall workings in the Bannock 
Band, but the workings in this seam were also sealed off and abandone<.1. at that 
time, following the explosion which occurred in a sealed-off area of old workings 
in the r..lain Band Seam and which seriously affected the workings in the Bannock 
Band. \Vork was then started in the Six Quarters Seam from a cross-measures 
drift which had previously been driven to catch this seam. Thereafter it was 
from the Six Quarters Seam that practically the whole of the coal output since 
1941 was obtained. 
11. The Six Quarters Seam has an average thickness of 2 ft. 9 in. of clean coal 
with a volatile matter content of approximately 37 per cent. The floor is a 
fairly strong fireclay, and the immediate roof consists of 2 ft. of shale overlain 
by a band of coal 20 in. thick. Above this lies more shale until another thin 
seam of coal, with a fireclay floor, is reached, about 12 it. up. The full dip of 
the seam is 1 in 10 in a westerly direction. The under-sea cover in the area 
concerned is about 120 fathoms. 
12. The first districts to be developed and worked from the Six Quarters 
Drift were No. 1 South and what are now called the old Nos. 1 and 2 North 
Districts (see Plan No. 1). They were advancing machine-cut conveyor longwall 
faces. Old No. 2 District finished in 1946, but coal production in old No. 1 
District continued until April, 1947. The dismantling of plant and withdrawal of 
materials from this district had not been completed at the date of the explosion. 
In the meantime, in anticipation of the decline of output from these districts and 
also in accordance with the general development plan for the working of the Six 
Quarters Seam, further development work was carried on seawards in a north­
westerly direction. At the date of the explosion, the lay-out and full extent 
of the workings completed and still in progress in this area were as shown in 
6 
Plan No. 2. These workings comprised No. I Hoise, No. 2 Rise and No. 2 Dip 
District, all advancing double-unit longwall machine-cut conveyor faces' the 
continuation of No. 3 Trunk Road known as Skelly's Heading: a Shortwall 
Face known as No. 1 Dip off No. 3 Trunk Road; the Back-End Shortwall 
Face; No. 2 Dip Heading (Allen's Drift), which had been dri ven in stone to 
connect with the seam on the inbye side of a fault; and, finally, BrannoD's 
Heading. which was being driven in coal from No. 2 Dip Heading to connect 
with the return air.vay from No. 2 Dip Longwall. Except for No. I Rise District 
which had ceased production in January, 1947, on striking a fault, work was 
proceeding in all of these places at the dafe of the explosion. Because of faulted 
ground, the left face of No. 1 Rise District lagged considerably behind the right 
side face. ' 
13. With the exception of No. 2 Dip Heading (Allen's Drift), in which pneu­
matic picks were used in coal-getting, all coal was undercut by compressed-air 
driven chain coal-cutting machines, the machine employed on the No. 2 
Dip face being fitted for wet-cutting. The coal was transported from the faces 
by conveyors to a central loading point near the outbye end of No. 3 Trunk 
Road beyond its junction with No. 2 Dip Trunk Road. The face and inbye 
gate conveyors were operated by compressed-air, while the main trunk belt 
conveyors were electrically driven. From the central loading point the coal was 
taken in 10 cwt. capacity hutches by under-rope endless haulage to the shaft 
fully two miles outbye, by way of the main intake airway. 
14. Shot-firing was practised in the coal on all faces, in the rippings or brushmgs 
and, on the No. 2 Dip face at least, also in the roof along the face opposite the 
wastes, in order to get stone for strip packs. The shot-holes were bored by 
compressed-air driven rotary drills. Permitted sheathed explosive (Polar Ajax) 
and sand-day stemming were used throughout. 
15. The method of roof support on roadways was mainly by steel arches, 
while wood props and lids were used at the actual working face. The system 
of support and roof control on the No. 2 Dip double-unit longwall face-the 
face on which the explosion started-consisted of wood props and lids at the 
coal face, roadside packs along the gateways and strip packs of varying widths 
built in the wastes and having between them varying widths of wastes, opposite 
which wood chocks were set. 
(c) U1lderground Lt"ghting 
16. The types of lamp provided for general use underground were Ceag 
2·s-volt Alkaline Supcrlite electric cap lamps, with ordinary Protector Bame 
safety lamps for gas detection by the workmen where required by the General 
Regulations, and Protector No. 6 flame safety lamps for the officials. In addition, 
six Nile 2· s-volt Alkaline cap lamps were in use. Fixed electric lights (rom 
the mains were also provided at the central loading point and at certain parts 




(d) V wtilatioll Lt 
17. The main ventilation was produced by a steam-driven \Valker 
Indestructible fan placed near the top of the upcast shaft. The fan, erected 
in 1903, was said to be designed to pass 150,000 cub. ft. of air per minute 
with an 8 in. water-gauge when running at 275 revolutions per minute. An 
air measurement taken in the fan drift some weeks before the explosion showed 
that approximately 60,000 cub. ft. of air per minute was passing with the fan 
running at 240 revolutions per minute, with a water-gauge of 5·8 iD. The 
general direction of the ventilation, the air splits and the quantities passing at 
various points as recorded in the air measurement book for the month of July, 
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and the firedamp content of the air at several points in the circuit, as revealed 
by analyses of air samples taken shortly before the explosion, are shown in 
Plan No. I. 
18. It wiII be seen from Plans Nos. I and 2 that the intake air was sput at 
No. 3 Junction. The air in the rise split travelled inbye along No. 3 Trunk Road 
and was coursed round No. 1 Dip Shortwall face, and the left and right faces 
of No. 2 Rise District, before passing to the return ainvay. The air in the second 
splirpassed part way along No. 2 Dip Trunk Road and was coursed around No. 2 
Dip Face, entered the Back-End Short wall from No. 2 Dip Heading and then 
passed to the main return by way of an overcast over No. 3 Trunk Road. The 
face of No. 2 Dip Heading (Allen's Drift) was ventilated by fresh intake air 
by means of two small compressed-air driven auxiliary fans placed in series 
inside tubing. the outer length of which passed through the three brattice doors 
on No. 2 Dip Trunk Road. A second air-crossing at the junction of the return 
from the No. 1 Dip ShortwaU Face with No. 3 Trunk Road was due to be 
completed on the night of the explosion, with a view to providing a separate 
ventilation split for this face. 
(e) Output and Persons Employed 
19. During the three months prior to the explosion, the output of the colliery 
was just over 2,000 tons per week. In addition to normal coal production, a 
considerable amount of development and repair work was also being done at this 
pit. Work was organized on three shifts. Coal filling, haulage and coal winding 
were done on the day-shift, pan-shifting, brushing and packing, and coal 
cutting on the back-shift, and back brushing and general repairs on the night­
shift. The nonna! complement of workmen on the three shifts was 177, 159 and 
104 persons, respectively. On the 15th August, the day of the explosion, 166 
persons had been working underground on the day-shift and 133 persons on the 
back-shift-the shift on which the explosion occurred. Of these back-shift 
workmen, however, 14 persons were on a .. staggered" shift and had all ascended 
the shaft by 5.40 p.m. and, because of illness, another back-shift worker had also 
ascended by that time. This left 118 persons underground at the actual time 
of the explosion. 
(f) Management of the Mine 
20. The mine was under the daily supervision of Mr. 'lvV. H. McAllister who, 
after being Under-Manager at the colliery for over 3 years, was promoted to be 
Manager, in November, 1946. To assist him he had one senior oversman on the 
day-shift, a back-shift oversman, three sectional oversmen, an official designated 
as a ventilation engineer, and a number of deputies and shot-firers. The Manager 
was supervised by a Colliery Group Agent, MT. D. McPherson, who, in turn, 
came under the direction of the Area General Manager for Cumberland, 
Mr. ]. G. Helps, and of a Deputy Production Director for the Division, Mr. J. A. 
Nimmo. The Agent, MT. McPherson, had taken up his duties at the end of 
March, 1947, in succession to Mr. A. B. MacDonald, the former General Manager 
of the Cumberland Coal Co. (Whitehaven) Ltd., while Mr. Helps and Mr. Nimmo 
commenced their supervisory duties at the William Pit on 1st January, 1947, on 
the advent of Nationalization. 
(g) Precautions Agaillst Coal Dust 
21. Suitable arrangements were made to meet the requirements of the General 
Regulations in respect of precautions against coal dust. The roadways were 
apportioned in numbered zones to enable systematic cleaning-up, stone-dustin� 
and sampling to be done. Several persons were employed daily in cleaning-up 




1<�a?ing po�ts, The duties of, the" ventilation engineer" included the Super­\,1"lon of tlus work, the collechon of the necessary samples for analysis, and the 
recording of the required information in the prescribed book. Contrary to the 
statutory requirements, dust samples were not collected during the month of 
July. About 3! lb. of stone dust per ton of coal output were used underground 
for stone�dllsting on roadways and before shot-firing. The incombustible dust 
1lsed was produced from limestone obtained from quarries in Cumberland. The 
results of the analyses of roadway dust samples collected after the explosion 
and over a period of months before the explosion showed that, on the whole, 
stone-dusting had been satisfactory from the view-point of the standard laid 
down by the Regulations. So far as the coal face was concerned, the longwall 
coal cutter working on the face in the No. 2 Dip District was fitted for wet 
cutting and there was little evidence of coal dust to be seen on the face in this 
district, 
IJL-NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION 
(0) Discovery a"d Prtli11lillory Attempts at ResClte 
22. The explosion occurred at 5.40 p.m. on the 15th August, 1947, when 
118 ptrsons were at work underground on the back-shift. There were only 
14 survivors. Eleven of these, including onsetters, haulage hands and three 
repairers, were at work on the outbye side of the area seriously affected by the 
expJo�on at points ranging from the downcast pit bottom to a point fully a mile 
in bye on the main intake haulage road where the three repairers were engaged 
in renewing steel arches. Of these eleven persons, only one was injured-a 
rtpairer, who was taken to hospital as a result of slight injuries sustained when 
he was blo\\TI off the barrel on which he was standing when the explosion happened. 
The remaining three sunrivors, who were working at the face of No. 2 Rise 
District on the inbyc side of the area traversed by the explosion, had a 
miraculous escape, and were brought to the surface in a somewhat exhausted 
condition on the afternoon of the following day. A fuller reference to their 
remarkable escape will be gi"en later. The probable disposition, immediately 
prior to the explosion, of the 104 persons who lost their lives and of the three 
bn'mcn who sun"i,'ed, is shown in Plan No. 2. 
23. There was nothing in the e,'ents priOI to the explosion which had given 
the management cause for worry or alarm. For some considerahle time, 
work had been proceeding quite normally. Nothing untoward had happened, 
had been observed or had been reported that indicated danger, let alone an 
impending disaster of great magnitude. The work of the day-shift on the 
15th .\ugust had been completed without incident; the back-shift workers 
had gone do"Vll to work at their allotted tasks; the 14 persons on the 
.. stag-gered " �hift had completed their day's work and had ascended the 
mine about 5.30 p.m. with no hint of anything out of the ordinary; and, 
lastly, a sick back-shift worker ascended about 5.35 p.m. About 5 minutes 
later came the filst warning of the explosion. The onsetter felt a .. rush of 
wind" coming from inbye which raised the dust, and, although the blast was 
quite strong, it did not knock him over. He knew at once that something 
serious had happened, and immediately telephoned to bank, He then went 
100 yards along the siding to the pit circuit telephone where he found a haulage 
hand trying to telephone inbye \\�thout result. 
24. The Manager, Mr. W. H. McAllister, had left the colliery a few minutes 
before the warning was received at the surface, and on reaching home received 
an urgent message to return to the pit at once. He did so and arrived back 
about 6 p.m. All the information he could then get was that" something had 
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happened underground." On his way to the shaft he met the surface com­
pressor attendant, who told him the compresEor was running at full speed and 
he thought there must be "an open end somewhere." After instructing the 
attendant to keep the compressor running until he received further instructions, 
Mr. McAllister descended the shaft. He was not long in coming to the conclusion 
that there had bc-en an explosion. and he immediately telephoned to the surface 
for urgent messages to be sent to all his superior officers, H.M. Inspector of 
Mines, representatives of the National Union of Mineworkers, the Rescue 
Station, the Chief Engineer and Electrician and two local Doctors. All 
responded to the call without delay. 
25. The Manager then went inbye along the main intake road to explore, 
taking a few workmen with him. He had not gone very far when he noticed 
a peculiar smell which, from previous experience, he associated immediately 
with an explosion. On reaching the air crossing from the Six-Quarters Seam 
to the main return in the Main Band Seam (Plan No. I) he sent two workmen 
in to examine the doors and the state of the air in the return, with a view to 
reaching two repairers, Fox and �Iarshall, who were working in the main 
return. They reported the doors intact, the air deadly, and any attempt at 
rescue impo�ible. Two workmen were at once sent to the shaft to bring in 
canaries and a portable reviving apparatus. The remainder of the party 
proceeded inbye. The separation doors in the first connexion between intake 
and return in the Six Quarters Seam were found intact, but from this point 
inbye signs of explosive violence became more evident, and the smell in the 
atmosphere more noticeable. The party pressed on. \Vhen the junction 
of Old No. 2 North was reached, they found tubs derailed, roof girders displaced 
and the roof weighting badly. After setting some workmen on to strengthen 
the roof supports the party pressed on again but found the roadway dangerous 
because of numerous falls. The party then returned to the junction of Old Xo. 2 
North District and found intake air entering it. This roadway had been 
previously sealed off by a brick stopping with two half-doors in it. On the 
inbye side of the brick stopping there was a wooden" clincher" stopping with 
a sheet in it. At the air-crossing itself, there were two doors leading into the main 
return. One was blown off and the other blown open and damaged. The return 
airway was heavily fouled with deadly afterdamp. Returning to the junction 
the party tried to get further inbye along the main intake. but after travelling a 
few yards beyond the point reached on their first exploration they were forced to 
abandon the attempt because of heavy falls and roof weighting. About this time 
the Agent, Mr. D. McPherson, and the Chief Planning Engineer, Mr. A. B. Dawson, 
arrived with canaries, followed soon after by the first Mines Rescue Team. The 
canaries were tried in the return airway and immediately collapsed. Because of 
falls and dangerous roof conditions. no further exploration was possible by the 
main intake and haulage road until repairs had been effected and the Vf�ntilation 
restored. And since the only possible approach to the inbyc workings was by 
way of the return airway, which was fouled by the poisonous afterdamp of the 
explosion, thereafter, until the ventilation was restored, all exploration and 
recovery work was done by fully equipped rescue teams. 
(b) Work of Trained Rescue Brigades 
26. With the arrival of Superintendent Charlton and the three pennanent 
rescue corps men, bringing with them the necessary equipment from the 
Cumberland Central Rescue Station at Brigham, and of trained rescue men 
from the \Vhitehaven and other collieries in the Cumbcrland coalfield, rescue 
and recovery work was set in motion without delay about 7 p.m. on the night 
of the explosion. From the preliminary reports of the first rescue teams in 
action it very soon became evident that a disaster of appaUing magnitude had 
(80H") 
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occurred and that there seemed little hope of rescuing anyone alive. More­
over. because of the heavy death roll and the long distance to be travelled by 
the teams in road ways full of noxious gases and badly obstructed by falls 
damaged plant and machinery. it also became apparent that, if the exploratio� 
and recovery work was to be carried out expeditiously, more trained rescue 
men would be needed than the Cumberland coalfield could supply. Accordingly. 
teams were brought from Durham and Northumberland Stations that night 
under the charge of Chief Officer Mills. who then took charge of operations. 
Later, assistance and equipment were also received from the Boothstown Rescue 
Station in Lancashire, and the Coat bridge Rescue Station in Scotland. In all, 
35 teams took part in the operation-probably the largest number ever engaged 
on this work at a colliery-making 105 underground visils, 75 of which were 
made by the 14 regular Cwnberland teams. As was to be expected, they did 
magnificent work under arduous and dangerous conditions but, despite their 
numbers, the strain during the first two days was too heavy and a break in the 
work had to be enforced at thc week-end to give the men a much-needed and 
well-earned rest. Certain matters in connexion with the organization and arising 
out of the work of the trained Rescue Brigades wil.l be discussed later. 
?:7. All the reports of rescue teams for the period covering the night of the 
• 
.. 
explosion and the following morning, relative to the conditions prevailing in -1 
the inbye workings of the Six Quarters Seam, gave no grounds for hope that 
any of the missing men could possibly be alive. During this period the rescue 
teams were operating from a fresh-air base in Old �o. 2, adjacent to the air 
crossing. At first their work was confined to exploration in the hope of finding 
:::.omeonc alive. As more trained rescue teams became available. some teams 
were detailed to recover bodies of victims; but the work of exploration still 
went on. J t came, therefore, as a tremendous surprise when, in the early 
afternoon of the 16th August-fully 20 hours after the explosion-three men, 
J. E. Birkelt, D. Hinde and J. J. \Veighman, suddenly made their appearance 
in the main haulage road. Hopes were immediately revived that others might 
!ltiU be alive. About this time, the fresh-air base was advanced inbye to No. 3 
Trunk I�oad. and every available rescue team put on to explore every part of 
the inbye workings which was not so obstructed as to prevent entry. \"'ith the 
advance of the fresh-air base. the shorter distances now to be travelled made 
the joumey to the inbye workings practicable in the limited time during which 
the teams could operate beyond their base. But no further signs of life were 
found. Except for the rest period already mentioned on the night of the 
17th/18th, the trained rescue teams continued their labours until the recovery 
of the last body from the pit at 9 p.m. on the 23rd August. 
(c) Exploratioll of the Explosion A rea 
28. Concurrently with the work of the trained rescue teams, who entered the 
inbye workings by way of the return ainvay, relays of workmen and officials 
worked continuously on the main haulage road in fresh intake air, clearing 
falls, setting supports and restoring the ventilation. Despitc their efforts, 
it was not until the 27th August, nearly twelve days after the explosion, that 
it became possible to make a complete inspection of the whole of the inbye 
workings traversed by the explosion. 
29. As the ventilation and travelling conditions in the various roadways 
and faces traversed by the explosion were restored, investigations extending 
over many days were made by H.M. Inspectors, members of staff of the 
:\linistry's Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch, colliery officials and 
other representatives of the National Coal Board, and by representatives of the 
workmen. There was evidence of vio]ence in many places. The position of the 
bodies as located by the rescue teams and the condition and location of all 
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plant and machinery. of falls and other relevant matters were carefully noted 
and are shown in some detail in Plan No. 3. Indications of direction of force 
as shown by the displacement of stoppings. tubs, supports, plant and other 
movable objects were carefully noted and recorded. 1 personally made two 
underground inspections of the scene of the disaster, accompanied by repre­
sentatives of the Inspectorate, Management and workmen. 
(d) Th. Sto,y of th. Tlm. Survivors 
30. On the day of the explosion, Birkett and Hinde, both brushers, descended 
the mine at 2.30 p.m., while \Veighman, a pan-shiiter, descended at 1.30 p.m. 
They were at their work in the No. 2 Rise District, when the explosion happened. 
All three-the" three living miracles" as they were called by �1r. Abe Maffat 
of the National Union of l\.1ineworkers-gave evidence at the Inquiry and had 
a remarkable story to tell. Each told of his unique experience very impressively, 
so much so, that I think it right to quote Birkett's own dramatic words from 
the transcription of the official short-hand notes :-
" Examillalion of Mr. J. E. Bi,k.tt by M,. Edwa,ds " 
Q.-You were on this job round about 5.30 or just after? A.-Yes. 
Q.-What happened at the time? A.-There was 12 of us together working 
round where I was, and there was a terrible report. 
Q.-One? A.-One. 
Q.-Yes. A.-Just as if the drums of our ears had burst, it was that severe, 
and the air like fluttered, and when it was over everyone said they thought the 
drums of their ears were going to burst. A chap called Clark, and Hewer-he 
was acting overman-thought it was the short wall face had coUapsed. So 
Clark says" Come on, we will go and see Joe ", he said" we will go and see if 
it has collapsed ". So they went away, and two or three minutes after I says 
" 1 will go and get my bait ", but when I got about 10 yards up the face 
someone shouts" Hurry up, come on ". 'Vhen we got up and off the face into 
the mothergate, we put our clothes on and at the four road ends we were all 
congregating there when I heard Clark say to Hewer" Hurry up Joe, and get 
on the face and see what is wrong ". Nicholson, the deputy, says" Are we all 
here? ". I said" Yes H, and he says" Follow me n. We set off to go out. 
When we got so far by one dip air crossing just up there it was terrible thick, and 
the deputy started to go down and one or two more, and as he was going down 
someone asked for an oil lamp. [asked him if he had put his out or had it gone 
out, and he said he put it out. Then an oil lamp came into my hands, where 
from I don't know. With that someone says" This door's open "-that was 
in the air crossing, and that is only a small door. The men started to go in it. 
Of course being very small at that time you would have thought they were 
crushing. They were a shade and I turned and said " Don't panic �en ". 
When we got in it was red hot. I took my coat off and threw it away, and next 
thing was Jimmy Rigg says" Can we not get down hcre Jack "-that is down 
by onc dip tail-gate round by this face-" and get out ". I says" No, we are 
going to face it all the way". With that I says to Hinde " Can you tell m£' 
where there is any water? ", and he says" Main cnd ". I says" Come on in 
h " ere . . . . 
Q.-Meaning Skelly's? A.-Yes. Skelly's. As I was going I asked a chap 
to come, but someone shouted to him and he didn't. \Vhy we will never know. 
As Hinde and I were going down into the end we heard \Veighman's voice. He 
asked if that was Jack and I said" Yes, and Danny". As we were crawling 
down I says to Hinde " [ am not going to make it H. He said" Try Jack H. 
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I says " I am not going to make it ", so he shouted to \Veighman and they came 
and pulled me out down by the loader end into the end. I laid face down for 
a long time. ,rhen my heart became normal and my head stopped throbbing 
I said to Hinde and \Veighman. I said " God is good, we wi.ll get out of here." 
I �ked them what water we had, they said two bottles. I said " Don't drink 
it ". I saw what bait I had and had a little bit. They had theirs and after 
the bait they said " \Vhat about having a go ". I says to \Veighman " You 
take the lamp, Jimmy Ho I had the 0 0 0 0 
Q.-You are referring to the oil lamp ? A.-Yes. r says " You take the 
oil lamp " ,  1 had a hawk, and I said " Danny, bring the water "-the two 
bottles like. So wc tried. \\'hen we got about 20 or 30 yards inbye that cro�!)ing 
we had to retreat again. \Ve went back and tried two or three times. 
Q.-\\'as the atmosphere stuffy ? A.-Yes, it was bad. 
Q.-It was smoky ? A .-Tt was bad. \\'hen we were lying, I do not know 
what time it wouJd be, Hinde says " They are a long time of coming, Jack 
t t
, 
and I said " Yes ", but he said " There must be a big fall ". I said " There must 
be tt, I said " If they have to come from the pit bottom they will hurry, and 
we will get out as fast as possible " .  I said " God is good and we will get out to . 
\\'hile wc were lying there Hinde says " Jack, look at this lamp tt. I looked 
and gas was right up the barrel, so we decided to have another go. \Ve set off 
again and when we got to the brow top the lamp went out. He says to me 
" \\'hat are wc going to do ? . . I said " If we go back there we have had it tt. 
J said " I( we go on we have a chance of getting out or else we go under ", 
I had a !';carf round my neck, and asked Hinde to wet it, which he did. ] asked 
them if they had a scarf and they said " No " ,  I said t t  Take a stocking off ", 
and Hinde tore his shirt, and \Veightman took his vest off. We wet them and 
set off out. As we were passing the dead, \reiglunan felt one of their anns, but 
before we went I said to Jimmy " Click Nichy's oil lamp ". He got that oil 
lamp and we got out to the second air crossing, 
Q.-That is the second oil lamp ? A .-Yes. \Ve got to the crossing and when 
wc got on the top Hindc said " There is a light here ", and I said " We don't 
want that t t , and then Hinde said " There is air coming up here ". J said 
.. That is where we want to be H .  As we were going down Hinde said " This is 
better than winning the Irish Sweep ". \re travelled out right to the entrance 
of Xo. 3. As we were going up the main road and got so far I said " For a pipe 
a minute, we want another minute H and had another. As we came to each {all 
wc went over the top until we came to the last one outbye. \Ve got to there and 
we could hear knocking. ] said " \\'ait a minute ". I knocked on the plate 
but they could not hear, I sajd .. Come on ]immy. over the top H, and as we 
were going up I says " Hello t t .  From when ".'e got on the top we saw men. 
That is it. 
Q.-You had no idea of the time or anything ? A .-Nothing, 
31. H inde and \Veighman told equally human and dramatic stories, confirming 
what Birkett had said. Despite their terrifying ordeal in the inbye workings and 
their labours in scrambling O\'er the numerous falls on the main haulage road on 
their way out bye, the three men were cheerful and in surprisingly good condition 
when they reached the workmen engaged in repair work at the outbye end of the 
fallen roadway, The survivors, after receiving the necessary attention, were 
then brought to the surface and remond to hospital. A day there and a 
short holiday soon restored them to normal health. All three showed remarkable 
presence of mind in a serious emergency and displayed considerable moral 
courage and a high sense of judgment in weighing up the possibilities and 
deciding to retreat to the inbye workings rather than make a rash bid for safety 
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by rushing outbye. They again showed their good judgment by their decision to 
make their way out bye at the time they did. Altogether their conduct was 
worthy of high praise. I have already brought this matter to your notice with 
a view to its appropriate recognition. 
(e) The Use of Trai,,,d Dogs 
32. It is of special interest to record that dogs were used underground in a coal 
mine for the first time in an attempt to locate bodies buried under falls. This 
suggestion, first made by Mr. I .  G. E. Leek, H.M. Inspector of Mines and Rescue 
Apparatus Testing Officer, was at once accepted by the respresentatives of all 
parties. Mr. Leek thereupon telephoned the R.A.F. Police Dog Training School 
at Staverton. The Provost Marshall immediately granted permission and forth­
with dispatched in a truck FiLl. Cooper and two Corporals, Marshall and lenkin" 
in cbarge of two trained police dogs, " Rex " and .. Prince ", Unfortunately 
dogs trained in body recovery work were not available. Later the party was 
joined by Corporal Darnall. Another dog, " Jet ", was collected from its 
owner on the journey north. " Jet " had done a lot of body recovery work 
during the London air raids but had been back with his owner as a pet for nearly 
two years. A training gallery was hurriedly prepared at the pit top, where the 
dogs were given a little practice before being taken down the pit. 
33. AJthough none of the men in charge of the dogs had ever been down a mine, 
they never hesitated for a moment when asked to do so. For these men to go 
underground for the first time and do a job of work under the conditions then 
prevailing in the \¥illiam Pit required " guts " of a high order. tn spite of the 
handicaps of lack of training in body recovery work and of working in very 
strange conditions, the dogs were considered to have done useful work. tt  was 
thought for several days that a missing haulage hand would be found beneath 
one of several large falls on the main haulage road. The dogs worked these faUs 
several times but showed little interest in any particular place, and rightly so, 
because eventually one of the mutilated bodies previously found was identified 
as the missing man. By this time only two bodies were missing. Although 
there was little doubt as to which large fall these bodies were under, nevertheless 
those on the spot were agreed that the dogs, after working the falls, were valuable 
in giving an indication as to the position of the bodies within the faU. 
34. I consider this unique trial indicated that dogs properly trained for body 
recovery work in mines might well give valuable assistance in locating bodies 
buried under falls and that the use of trained dogs is well worthy of further con� 
sideration and trial. 
IV.-THE PLACE OF ORIGIN AND CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSIO� 
(a) The Place of Origin and Source DJ Jg1titio,� 
35. There was complete agreement among all the mining engineers and other 
expert witnesses at the Inquiry as to the place of origin and cause of the 
explosion. Following upon careful im'cstigations underground and their 
consideration of all relevant factors, such as signs of violence, direction of force, 
condition and position of bodies, nature of the work being done at the time and 
probable or possible sources of ignition in relation to the possibility of the presence 
of an inflammable or explosive atmosphere at the site of a suspected source of 
ignition, the expert witnesses were unanimous that :-
(n) the explosion started on the No. 2 Dip Longwall Face ; 
(b) it originated with the firing of a charge of sheathed permitted explosi,·e 
placed in a rising shot�hole drilled in the roof between the coal-face and the 
waste and directed towards the waste ; 
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(c) the shot-hole passed through a roof hreak and the inner end of it either 
ma�e contact with, or was in very close proximinity to, a bed separation 
cavity ; 
(d) this cavity contained an accumuJation of inflammable gas which was 
continuous with a larger accumulation of explosive gas in the waste ; 
(e) the firing of the shot ignited the gas in the bed-separation cavity and 
the gas burned for a short interval of time before the flame reached the 
larger accumulation of gas which exploded violently ; and 
(f) the explosion, once started, tTa versed a considerable area of working 
fac� and roa�ways before it was finally arrested, due to lack of fuel, a 
consIderable distance from the point of origin. 
36. Having first satisfied myself that all other possible source:.. of ignition 
could be eliminated, r had no hesitation whatsoever in coming to the same 
conclusions. 
(b) Other Possible Sources oJ Igm·tion 
37. I he other possible sources were : defective flame or electric safety 
lamps ; electrically operated machinery, cables and switch-gear ; compressed­
air plant and acceswries ; signalling apparatus ; magneto exploder ; and 
frictional heating or sparking. FoUowing a careful and expert examination of 
all these possibilities, the only potential source of ignition of an inflammable 
firedamp-air mixture discovered was a patched compressed-air hose which showed 
definite signs of burning at the patch. But since till!:> piece of hose was lying on 
the floor near the face end of the mothergate in No. 2 Dip Face, it was in­
conceivable that it could have been in direct contact with an inflammable 
firedamp-air mixture at the time the explosion happened. It was therefore 
ruled out as a possibility in this explosion. 
38. Nevertheless, as this potential igniting source is liable to be overlooked 
at collieries, I think it necessary and advisable to draw attention to this possibl� 
danger and to indicate how the danger arises. For examination and test, an 
8-in. length of the 2-in. diameter hose containing the patched puncture, together 
with a piece of sacking folded to give four thicknesses, wruch was strapped over 
the puncture, were sent to the Ministry's Hesearch Laboratories at Buxton. 
Examination of the wall of the hose at the puncture showed unmistakeable 
.... igns of buming of the cotton reinforcing, while one edge of the sacking also 
... howed signs of buming. Further, the imprint of the patch could clearly be 
'>Ccn on the hose, while the recovered patch was about one inch shorter than the 
Imprint. Presumably the remainder had been burnt away. Comparison with 
previous experiments indicated that this puncture had been a " squealing " 
It'ak and that the heating had been caused by internal friction. Further 
examination showed that the puncturing of the hose caused tearing of the 
inside surface, the tears radiating from the puncture and leaving tongues of 
rubber and reinforcement. It was concluded that the escape of air caused these 
to vibrate at a high frequency, giving rise to some heat due to friction at external 
,-ubbing surfaces, but even more due to internal friction of the tongues as they 
"tretched and bent. It was suggested that the cotton reinforcing had then 
disintegrated and part of it scattered as sparks which were capable of igniting 
an inflammable firedamp-air mixture, or, if they fell on suitable combustible 
material, of starting a fire. There seemed liUle doubt in this case that they 
caused either the smouldering or burning of the sacking wrapper. Clearly, an 
Improperly patched puncture in a compressed-air hose is a potential source of 
-
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.• Ull and a positive danger if such hose is used in any part of a mine where 
may be in contact with combustible matter or inflammable gases. I should 
that attention has already been drawn to this danger in the Twenty-third 
Report of the Safety in Mines Research Board (1944) and in a letter 
Dr. H. F. Coward, the Director of Research, published in the " Colliery 
.. and " Iron and Coal Trades Review ", on 24th June, 1 944. 
(c) Operations on No. 2 D':p Face 
39. Since it was abundantly clear from the evidence that no SUspIcion 
to any part of the mine other than the No. 2 Dip Face, it is necessary 
to describe the work being done on this face immediately prior to the . 
in order to get a picture of what happened. There were no survivors 
from this face but, so far as could be ascertained, the work in progress on the 
face that afternoon included (i) the ripping and packing of the mothergate, 
(ii) the undercutting of the coal face, (ill) pipe-shifting on the right-side face, 
(iv) advancement of the face chocks and of the conveyors on both left-side and 
right-side faces, and (v) the advancement of the strip packs on both sides of 
the face using stone obtained from the waste. From the position of the bodies 
and the state of progress of the work up to the moment of the explosion, it is 
clear that the work had been proceeding at the nonnal rate, and that the job 
of pipe-shifting had been completed, for the fitters by this time had left the face. 
Since all the expert \vitnesses were agreed that the explosion originated with 
shot-firing, only this aspect of the work on this face need now be considered 
in detail. 
(d) Shot-firing "" No. 2 Dip Face 
40. Investigation showed that eleven shots, charged with a sheathed 
permitted explosive, Polar Ajax, had been fired by deputy Murtagh on No. 2 
Dip Face that afternoon, as follows :-
(a) four ripping shots in the canch in No. 2 Dip Mothergate ; 
(b) two roof shots on the left side of the face to provide packing material 
for strip packs ; and 
(c) five roof shots on the right-side face to provide packing materials for 
strip packs. 
The order of firing was probably (a), (b) and (c). The shots under (b) and (c) 
were bored from the face towards the waste at an inclination varying from 20 
to 25 degrees to the plane of roof, with the exception of one shot on the left-side 
face which had been bored from the waste towards the face. The holes were 
from 3 ft. 6 in. to 4 ft. long. 
4 1 .  There was no evidence to throw SUsplclon on the shots fired in the 
mothergate or in the left-side face. The roof shots on the right-side face were 
almost certainly fired in the order I ,  2, 5, 4 and 3 (see Fig. I ) .  Some of the 
material from shots Nos. I and 2 had been packed. The positions of the partially 
coiled firing cable and of the exploder (Fig. I)  indicated that shot No. 3 was the 
last shot to be fired and that this was done only a short time before the explosion. 
The bodies of shot-firer Murtagh, and of Brannon, a chock-drawer, were found 
lying opposite this shot-hole. Both men died from carbon monoxide poisoning ; 
but whereas Murtagh showed no sign of external injuries, Brannon had sustained 
a fractured skull and a severe neck laceration before death. 
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42. In explanation of  this, Mr. G. D. Nussey, H.l\l. District Inspector of 
suggested that when Murtagh was ready to fire shot No. 3, he sent 
down the face to prevent anyone approaching the shot from the 
of the right tail-gate while he went up towards the mothergate to 
fire the shot and guard the approach from that side ; that when the shot was 
fired Brannon was struck by a stone projected from the shot and had then 
immediately moved towards Murtagh who, having just detached the cable from 
exploder (and probably also heard a shout from Brannon) moved down 
towards him ; and that when they met nearly opposite the shot-hole, the 
explosion happened. Another explanation suggested was that immediately 
the shot was fired, both men saw some indication of flame, that both made 
towards the shot-hole to see what had happened, that when they met near the 
hole the explosion occurred and that Brannon was then struck by some missile 
projected by the explosion. But whatever the sequence of events, it is clear 
that there must have been a short interval of time between the firing of shot 
No. 3 and the actual explosion. 
(e) Detailed Examillation o[ Shot-holes 
43. Careful examination revealed no dangerous features associated with 
shot-holes I ,  2 and 5. These shots were therefore ruled out as possible causes 
of delayed ignition. Observations made with regard to shot-holes 3 and 4 
make it desirable to describe each in some detail. 
-t-t. The conditions of shot-hole No. 4, as noted by Drs. Grimshaw, Shepherd 
and Phillips of the Ministry's Safety in Mines Research Branch on 1st September, 
are i11ustr�ted in Fig. 2. An almost continuous trace, AB of the upper surface 
of the hole was left on the roof for a distance of about 3 ft. 6 in. At CE a further 
trace of about 6 in. of the lower surface was observed on a ledge of roof bordering 
a ca\;ty in a shatter zone caused by the shot. Starting at a point about 5 in. 
from B and going towards A, there were indications of clay stemming. From 
this it was assumed that the remaining 1 1  in. of hole contained the explosive. 
This length represented two 4 oz. cartridges. The explosive, clearly, had not 
expended its full energy in breaking down the roof bed, but had partly expended 
itself in producing the shattering observed beyond the above points B and C, 
resulting in a cavity extending upwards to the coal bed above the immediate 
shale roof. 
45. It was estimated that there was about 2 in. of shale between the end of the 
shot-hole as bored and the immediate roof bed. There was also a pronounced 
opening along the bedding plane between the shale roof and the coal above­
a condition that almost certainly existed when the shot was fired, for otherwise 
it would be difficult to explain the upward shattering effect. There is no reason 
to suppose that the 2 in. thickness of shale between the end of the hole and the 
bed separation cavity was broken before the shot. Experimental work at the 
Buxton Research Station has indicated that when a charge is fired in a hole 
which runs towards an opening containing an inflammable mixture of firedamp 
and air, a barrier of 2 in. of solid material (e.g. of stone or a plug of clay) renders 
ignition very improbable. The proximity of the hole to the parting above, 
therefore, constituted the only possibly dangerous feature of this shot. A sample 
of the atmosphere at point SI, taken through a metal tube inserted for a distance 
of 2 ft. 6 in. into the bed separation cavity showed on analyses : 71 · 7  per cent. 
Methane ; 7 · 05 per cent. Carbon Dioxide and 3·67 per cent. Oxygen. 
46. The conditions noted by the same three observers at shot-hole No. 3 
are illustrated in Fig. 3. This hole was bored immediately over a prop and the 
length AB was left more or less intact and partly filled with loose stones. The • 
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firing of t he shot had brought down the roof bed along the line of the bole between 
B and C and there was a 6-in. socket at the inner end. It is, therefore, highly 
probable that the explosive was not inserted to the end of the shot-hole but 
only as far as the point C, where there was a vertical roof fracture or cutter-break 
parallel with the face. As shown in the diagram. this break was closed laterally 
except for a small vertical pocket which crossed the hole, and it was found to 
extend upwards (or about 3 in., where it was crossed by a horizontal parting. 
at least ! in. wide. between the shale and coal beds. It is most unlikely that the 
vertical pocket was open to this extent before the shot was fired and it seems 
likely that it was partly filled with rock fragments which dropped away after 
the shot was fired. It is possible that the cross-section of the shot-hole was 
reduced at C by one of these fragments. Alternatively, there may have been 
a slight displacement across the vertical fracture at C, sufficient to disturb 
the continuity of the hole and thus prevent the charge from being pushed home. 
47. In addition there was extensive bed separation between the shale and the 
coal. \Vhen obtaining gas samples in the vicinity of the shot-hole, it was found 
possible easily to push the metal tube-l in. in diameter- through an opening 
at the back of the socket for a distance of at least 6 ft. The loudness of the noise 
made by the buried end of the tube during movement made it evident that this 
extended opening was horizontal and not far above the ripped surface of the 
roof bed. The experience of the investigators led them to conclude that this 
opening was present when the shot was fired. Measurements clearly showed 
that the back of the hole was driJJed to within a very short distance-possibly 
to within t in. at the nearest point-of the plane of bed separation, although 
at the time of the examination there was easy access through a thin layer of 
broken shale. It, therefore, remains a distinct possibility that this access 
existed at the moment of firing. The thrust of the drill could quite easily have 
broken the thin crust of shale for it must be remembered that the action of the 
shot itself did not produce any marked shattering of the socket. 
48. Two other features peculiar to shot-bole No. 3 were also observed, On 
the ripped surface of the roof bed in the waste there were pronounced cleat 
planes. Along one, about 8 in. to the left of the shot-hole, there was an opening 
of about i in. which extended to the bed separation cavity above the roof bed. 
There was another cleat plane 1 *  in. to the right of the shot-hole and, although 
this was not nearly so open, it was nevertheless a plane of weakness which 
would facilitate a local displacement of the roof and reduce the strength of the 
shale at the end of the shot-hole. This cleat formed one end of the vertical 
pocket located at C. Moreover, on the right-hand side (looking towards the 
waste) of the ripped portion of the roof, there was a detached piece of the roof 
bed bounded by an open break DEF, Fig. 3, which extended laterally over the 
waste. The projected extension of this break towards the shot-hole would 
cross the hole almost tangentially at a point near the explosive charge if, as is 
likely. the hole was blocked or obstructed at the vertical fracture already 
described. 
49. Three gas samples, 52, 53 and 54, were obtained near shot-hole No. 3. 
The position in which they were taken and their analyses are as follows :-. 
Carbon 
Position Jl.fetlrane D£o"ide 
per cellt. per cellt. 
52. At top of vertical pocket . .  88 · 4  7 · 42 
53. Five feet into break developed towards 
right-hand waste . . 1 · 91 
54. Six feet in bed-separation cavity along 
direction of shot-hole . .  5 · 03 • 
O ·  1 2  





1 9 · 57 











'" . , 
.... 
• I • • , ( 
• 
;1. 
I t co ;, • 
I ,I 
• 
" "7J . -'" 
d "P t< I 
I 
I 





The presence of the open cleat no doubt accounts for the lower percentage 
of methane in the sample taken some distance in the bed-separation cavity, 
but it is significant that the atmosphere here was inflammable and capable of 
self-propagation of flame at a slow speed. 
50. From these considerations, I think there can be little doubt that the 
firing of shot No. 3 originated the explosion. Moreover, the circumstances were 
such that the firing of the shot was likely to result in an ignition of firedamp 
in the bed-separation cavity between the shale and the overlying coal, the flame 
of which would travel slowly and unobserved along narrow openings until it 
encountered a larger volume of firedamp and air in the waste, thus giving the 
delay indicated by tbe factual evidence, between the firing of the shot and the 
development of the main explosion. 
V.-THE SPREAD OF THE EXPLOSION 
(a) Area Affecled by Ihe Flame 
51. With the exception of the Nos. I and 2 Rise Districts, SkcUy's Heading 
and the No. 1 Dip Shortwall Face off No. 3 Trunk Road, the explosion traversed 
almost all other inbye working faces and roadways and continued outbye along 
the main return airway for a distance of 60 yards beyond the main air-crossing 
over No. 3 Trunk Road and along the main intake haulage road for a distance of 
about halI-a-mile from its junction with No. 3 Trunk Road. In all, not less 
than 2,000 yards of roadway were traversed by the flame of the explosion. 
(b) V jolellce 
52. The explosion left a trail of death in its path and many heavy falls of 
ground. But apart from the badly wrecked main return air-crossing over 
No. 3 Trunk Road, there were few marked signs of extreme violence. Many 
empty tubs were left standing. signal wire supports were not bent, while roadway 
conveyors, although disturbed and distorted here and there, were not seriously 
damaged. This absence of signs of extreme violence suggests an explosion in a 
combustible mixture not far removed from the lower limit of infianunability. 
The numerous falls gave a deceptive appearance of violence. It is probable 
that these falls were largely due to the pressure of the explosion blast causing 
a slight lifting of the lower detached roof resting on the supports, thus easing 
the displacement of the supports. 
(c) Source of tlte Combustible Material 
53. As might be expected with so many interconnected open roadways, it was 
not easy always to detennine the exact direction of the passage of flame in 
certain of the inbye roads ; but this is of little moment. It is important, 
however, to detennine the source and nature of the combustible matter which 
enabled the explosion to spread as far as it did. The initial explosion in the 
waste of No. 2 Dip Right Face was almost certainly of firedamp only, and was 
essentially one of firedamp so far as the major part of the No. 2 Dip area was 
concerned. Thereafter, the spread of the explosion outbye was no doubt 
greatly assisted by the firedamp released or pressed out from the waste towards 
the outer end of the mothergate, especially at a point where the explosion had 
dislodged a stopping and a small roadside pack (see Plan No. 3). This firedamp 
would readily assist the explosion in its passage in both directions along No. 2 
Dip Trunk Road and also into the face of AUen's Drift where firedamp had 
previously been reported and which remained fouled with firedamp for some 
days afterwards. But the fact of the comparatively short spread of the flame 
along the main return airway does not suggest any extensive accumulation of 
firedamp in the district as a whole. Indeed, the weight of evidence suggested 
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that it was highly improbable that enough firedamp was available to propagate 
the flame of the explosion over the distance it was agreed the explosion extended. 
On the other hand, the great extension of the flame along the main intake 
suggests strongly that coal dust played no small part in propagating the explosion 
there. 
S-1. Against the view that coal dust played an important part, the results of 
analyses of numerous dust samples taken after the explosion showed that a 
high standard of stone-dusting had been reached. Moreover, following the 
explosion, there did not seem to the ordinary observer much evidence of coking. 
Only on the New Conveyor Road leading from Xo. 2 Dip Trunk Road to the 
Back End Shorlwall was coking at all obvious. It  must not be assumed from 
this, however, that the part played by coal dust must necessarily have been 
small. On all roadways there was a thin dust deposit,  such as might have been 
left by the passage of an explosion through a dust cloud containing an admixture 
of coal and stone dust. This thin deposit contained fine coke dust which was 
not obvious to the eye. The quantity of coked dust that is found depends on the 
quantity of coal dust exposed to flame, and if this dust is disseminated in a 
cloud, then most of the coal dust may be burned completely and the quantity 
of coke dust or coke deposit may be small. 
55. After careful consideration of the evidence on this point, I am driven to 
the conclusion that it is highly improbable that enough firedamp was available 
to propagate the flame of the explosion along the 2,000 yards of roadway 
including, most strikingly, the half-mile along the main intake. Since the only 
other possible fuel was coal dust, and bearing in mind the high standard reached 
in stone-dusting, it is necessary to inquire in some detail for the possible source 
of the coal dust. 
56. The most likely source was coal dust Irom the inbye conveyor roads. 
It is well known that in dry and dusty mines, coal dust collects rapidly when 
conveyors are in use and that this dust is notoriously difficult to keep constantly 
neutralized because it tends to accumulate insidiously, not only as a surface 
layer on the sides and roof, but also in quantity around loading and transfer 
points and under and along the \\Thole length of the conveyor stmctures. 1n 
such places it is difficult of access for brush and shovel and the coal dust is, 
therefore, not removed by the ordinary cleaning-up process which normally 
takes place daily, or even several times a day, in the immediate vicinity of a 
loading point. This dust is, nevertheless, still readily accessible to a blast of 
air, such as would be created in the early stages of a firedamp explosion at or 
near the working face. Clearly, so long as any dust remained to be raised, such 
a blast could raise tltis dust continuously as it travelled outbye along the 
conveyor roads and might thus produce a long cloud of coal dust moving ahead of 
the flame but ready to be inflamed when the flame of the firedamp explosion 
caught it up. If, of course, the road ways had been recently treated with stone 
dust, then the blast would also raise some stone dust as well. But, even although 
some cleaning-up, and perhaps even stone-dusting, is done during a coal loading 
shift in and around conveyor loading points, it is almost certain that, in general, 
the top layer of dust throughout the length of any conveyor roadway toward 
the end of a loading shift is almost entirely composed of coal dust. This top 
layer of coal dust would not be so marked in an outbye main haulage road whele 
the rate of deposition of coal dust is normally much less than that on a conveyor 
road. 
57. It seems to me that something of that nature must have happened in this 
case. The explosion, as already pointed out, was not of a violent nature. [ 
consider, therefore, that as the blast from the initial moderate firedamp explosion 
travelled along the inbye conveyor roads, it raised a continuous dust cloud, 
, 
• Smellie. J .  and Dryan, A. l\l,-" On the Efficiency of Incombustible Dust in thp Pre· 
vention of Coal Dust Explosions "-Trans. Inst. l\lin. E.1937-38, XCIV. 
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practicable to an intimate mixture throughout. I t  occurs to me also, that if 
some practicable means could be devised for rendering and maintaining a road. 
way surface, and especially that part of the floor under conveyor structures 
" dust intolerant ", i.e. treated in such a way as would ensure that any coal 
dust deposited on it was rendered indispersable, the dust danger on conveyor 
roadways would be considerably lessened. I t  may be that the present research 
work on the consolidation of roadway dusts will lead to the development of a 
means to that end. Finally, I should like to press the point very strongly that 
if compliance with the dust regulations at aU times in dry and dusty mines is 
to be reasonably assured, and the conditions in such mines aTC to be improved 
in respect of health and comfort, then all practicable steps must be taken in 
the first instance to prevent or reduce dust fonnation at its source, and to 
suppress by water infusion, sprays, wet-cutting, wet-drilling or other appropriate 
means, any dust that is inevitably made. 
Vr .-COMMENTS 
SHOT-FIRI�G PRACTICE 
(a) On the Examination 0J the Shot-hole Jor Breaks 
59. Clause 6 (d) of the principal Explosives in Coal Mines Order requires that, 
before a hole is charged, the shot-firer shall examine it for breaks running along 
or across it. No scraper or other tool for detecting breaks was found in the 
vicinity of the No. 2 Dip face and I can only conclude that, contrary to the 
Regulations, the shot-firer who charged and fired the fatal shot, and who lost 
his life in the explosion, had not examined the shot-hole for breaks. This was 
a grave omission. The condition of shot-hole No. 3, as examined several days 
after the explosion, has already been described and is illustrated in Fig. 3. 
Its condition then was such as would suggest that the presence of a break could 
readily have been detected had a proper tool been used for the purpose. \Vhether 
the condition of the shot-hole beJore the firing of the shot was such that a break 
could have been detected had the type of tool 'nonnally supplied at the colliery 
for detecting breaks been in fact used, is a matter for conjecture, but it does 
seem probable. 
60. I n mines where firedamp is a hazard, the examination of shot-holes for 
breaks seldom receives the close attention it merits, possibly in some measure 
due to the failure to use a properly designed and maintained break·detcctor. 
In view of the number of explosions of firedamp in recent years caused by 
shot-firing with pennitted explosives in holes crossed by breaks, I am of the 
opinion that the use of a break·detector made to an approved specification and 
properly maintained should be made compulsory. Reference to this and other 
matters relevant to shot-firing practice is made later. 
(b) On the Examination Jar l1iflammable Gas BeJore Shot-firing 
61. Clause 6 (f) (i) of the principal Explosives in Coal Mines Order requires 
that :-
.. No shot shall be fired, unless immediately before the shot is to be fired, the 
shot·firer has examined the place where the shot is to be fired and aU 
contiguous accessible places within a radius of 20 yards from the place, and 
has found them clear of inflammable gas and in all respects safe for firing. 
If within the aforesaid radius of the place there is any cavity which may 
contain inflammable gas and cannot be so examined, or any break where an 
examination cannot be made for inflammable gas issuing from it (other than 








62. In my Interim Report 1 pointed out that because of the words within 
the brackets in the above clause, it was permissible in law for a shot-firer to 
charge and fire a shot in close proximity to any inaccessible waste whether or 
not it contained or was likely to contain inflammable gas in such quantity as 
to be indicative of danger. 1 also stated that whilst I would not for one moment 
suggest that a shot-firer would fire a shot if he thought that shot would ignite 
inflammable gas, nevertheless 1 considered that the clause allowed too much 
latitude and that the statutory requirements of the firing of shots in all coal 
mines where inflammable gas was not unknown should be strengthened in such a 
way as to restrict the latitude allowed. The normal interpretation of 
" inaccessible " as used in Clause 6 (f) (i) is that the place cannot be examined 
by the shot-firer using his flame safety lamp. There is no doubt, however, that 
by means of, say, an aspirator attached to a thin tube or pipe, samples can be 
collected for examination so as to ascertain whether or not a so-called 
" inaccessible " waste in the immediate vicinity of a shot-hole does or does 
not normally contain inflam able gas in .such quantity as to be indicative of 
danger. After all, inflammable gas in an " inaccessible " place in close proximity 
to a shot is no less dangerous than if it had been found in an accessible place 
near the shot. 
(c) On the Use of Sheathed Permitted Explosives 
63. Only sheathed permitted explosives were used in the shots fired on the 
No. 2 Dip Face on the shift in which the explosion occurred. There seems to 
be a view in some quarters-a view unwarranted by the facts-that the use of a 
permitted sheathed explosive surmounts the potential danger of ignition of 
inflammable gas by shot-firing. It has been known, however, for many years, 
that it is potentially dangerous to fire a shot in a hole which passes through a 
break connected with a bed-separation cavity or a waste in a gassy mine, even 
when permitted and sheathed explosives are used and where the general ven­
tilation of the mine is considered good in terms of Section 29 of the Act. Never­
theless, the exact conditions necessary for ignitions in these circumstances 
cannot yet be defined. 'With a view to their determination, a series of experiments 
was conducted several years ago at the Laboratories of the Safety in Mines 
Research Board, but they proved inconclusive because of the limitations of the 
. .  Break Gallery " in which the experiments were conducted. Plans have been 
prepared for the provision of a new " Break: GaUery " which will permit a greater 
range of experimental conditions. In view of the number of ignitions and 
explosions initiated by the firing of shots in holes associated with breaks and 
open partings, it is essential in the interests of safety that research on this problem 
should be undertaken without further delay. I recommend, therefore, that 
immediate steps be taken to expedite this investigation. In this connexion, 
bearing in mind the practical difficulty of ensuring at all times that a shot-hole 
is not associated with breaks or partings, and other matters relevant to this 
explosion, I cannot do better than quote, in full, Safety Circular No. 137, 
issued on the 24th October, 1945, by my predecessor, Sir John R. Felton. 
It was addressed to the Owners and Managers of all Mines under the Coal 
Mines Act, 191 1 ,  and the Secretaries of National and Local Associations of 
Owners, Officials and \Vorkmen. It reads ;-
..  It  is clear from the records of ignitions of firedamp caused by shot-firing 
with permitted explosives that the most dangerous condition (or firing is 
when the shot-hole crosses, or ends in or very near to, a break or parting. 
As regards breaks crossillg the shot-hole the work of the Safety in Mines 
Research Board carried out over many years has all gone to show that the 
danger of an ignition of firedamp is substantially reduced if a sheathed 
explosive is used. The ends of the cartridges are not sheathed and it seemed 
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desirable, therefore, to study experimentally the possibility of prOviding 
further protection against an undetected break at the back of the shot-hole 
by a plug of clay inserted before the hole is charged. That has been done and 
a full account of the experiments has recently been published in the technical 
press. 
These experiments having shown that an additional means of safety is 
thus provided, I commend for general adoption, wherever pennitted explosives 
are used, the very simple practice of pushing a plug of stemming to the back 
of the hole before it  is charged. 
I must, however, emphasize that neither the sheathing of the explosive, 
nor a plug at the back of a hole, no. anything else yet known, will make 
it safe to fire a hole in which any break has been found, and that the prohibition 
against this in Clause 6 (d) of the Explosives in Coal Mines Order, 1934, 
remains in force. 
The dangers need to be more fully appreciated and shot-firers should be 
fully instructed as to the risks involved. They should be supplied with an 
effective break detector and be trained in its use. The best form of appliance 
is one designed for the purpose, that is, with a sharply defined ' V '  pointed 
projection at its head, and which does not bend readily in use." 
(d) 0" the Storage, Use and Handlillg of Explosives, and Shot-Firing Practice in 
Gmeral 
6-1. It was clear from the evidence of various witnesses in regard to such 
matters as (i) lack of agreement between the records of explosi"es and detonators 
issued from and returned to the surface store and the records of explosives and 
detonators issued to and used by shot-firers and deputies underground ; 
(ii) the finding of cartridges of explosives underground in places other than in 
secure cases or canisters ; (iii) the finding of detonators in places other than 
suitable and securely locked cases or boxes ; (iv) the finding of sheathing remo\' cd 
from cartridges ; (v) the siting of shot-holes ; (vi) the record of the number of 
shots fired by a deputy with statutory duties to perform ; (vii) thee :::�f.::�,�: I failure of a shot-firer to comply with certain requirements of the E 
in Coal l\rines Order before firing a shot ; and (viii) the high quantity of explosive 
used per ton of coal got ; that the whole business of storage, use and 
-
of explosives and shot-firing practice in general was not given enough care andl, 
attention. 
65. I t  was disclosed, for example, that on the day-shift preceding the shift 
on which the explosion occurred, the No. 2 Dip Face deputy had fired 
shots in addition to performing his statutory duties. Plainly his 
duties, or his shot-firing duties, or perhaps both, could only have been 
out in a very perfunctory manner. It was also disclosed that the position 
number of shot-holes required were left too much to the discretion of the 
borer. Although a shot-firer need not charge every shot-hole, and certainly 
not to charge and fire a shot in a hole that is not properly placed, . 
it is a sore temptation to him to make use of all shot-holes that are drilled. 
66. This whole business of the use and handling of explosives, and 
operations connected therewith, is oC vital importance to the safe working of 
colliery. It is essential for the management, therefore, not only to see that 
efficient system governing all phases is laid down, but also that the 
supervision is given to see that it is properly carried out. As so often 
what is the business of everybody becomes in the end the business of 
I suggest, therefore, that at all collieries where explosi,'cs are used, a 
investigation should be made into this matter with the object of devising 
most efficient system appropriate to the circumstances ; and that, thereatter. 
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a superior and responsible official of the mine should be given the direct 
responsibility of seeing that the approved system is efficiently applied and 
operated in practice on all three shifts. In my Interim Report I also recommended 
that it should be made a statutory requirement that the maximum number of 
shots which it is pennissible for shot-firers and deputies, respectively, to fire, 
should be fi.xed for each district of the mine after a trial made under working 
conditions, both in respect of the number of shots per statutory shift and per hour 
during the shift, the trials to have regard, in the case of a deputy, to his primary 
responsibility to carry out his statutory duties and, in the case of both shot-firers 
and deputies, to any additional duties which may be assigned to them, and any 
assistance given to them. 
(e) On the Practice of Firing Roof Shots on Longwall Faces to Obtai" Packing 
J.lf aterial 
67. As already explained, this explosion originated with the firing of a shot 
in a hole drilled at an angle into the roof on a iong\'vali face and directed towards 
the waste behind and immediately contiguous to the face. The purpose of this 
shot, and of several others fired that night on the No. 2 Dip Face, was to obtain 
packing material to extend the strip packs in the waste. Such shots are 
variously known as . .  cuckoos ", .. uppers " or . .  upper-cuts H .  The practice of 
firing them is (or was) common in several collieries in different parts of the 
country. Since, by definition, the practice applies only to shots fired at or near 
the edges of wastes on longwall faces, it is a practice fraught with grave risk 
and danger in many mines. I t  will not be denied that in a mine where firedamp 
is not unknown, a waste behind a longwall face is a place where inflammable 
gas is most likely to be found and is, morever, a place which cannot be examined 
for the presence of inflammable gas in the normal way by a deputy or shot-firer 
using his flame safety lamp. Further, the roof at or near the edge of a waste 
is just the place where breaks and bed-separation cavities are extremely prevalent 
and most liable to occur. This combination of dangerous factors. inflammable 
gas in conjunction with breaks or cavities, clearly indicates that the practice 
of firing " cuckoo " shots should be avoided like the plague. 
68. In evidence. the Manager not only stated that he was unaware that 
" cuckoo " shots were being fired but that he had given instructions that such 
shots were not to be fired. Either these instructions had not been clearly given 
or understood, or the supervision was insufficient to see that his instructions 
were properly carried out. The fact remains that " cuckoo " shots were fired 
and that the firing of one of them originated the explosion. Nevertheless. the 
Manager did not regard the practice as a dangerous one . •  provided. as he said, 
.
. 
it was properly carried out ". As I have already made plain, I regard the 
practice as one which should be prohibited in mines where firedamp is a hazard. 
In my Interim Report I suggested that. until the present statutory requirements 
in relation to shot-firing had been suitably amended or extended in aU coal mines 
where there was firing of " cuckoo " shots in close proximity to wastes containing 
or likely to contain inflammable gas in such quantities as to be indicative of 
danger, the management should consider immediately the taking of one or other 
or all of the following steps :-
(a) Prohibit the practice of firing " cuckoo " shots charged with explosives : 
(b) Keep the wastes as clear as possible from dangerous accumulations of 
firedamp ; and 
(c) Strengthen the system of support and roof control not only to prevent 
as far as practicable the formation of roof breaks and bed-separation cavities, 
but also to encourage the roof in the wastes to break down regularly as the 
temporary supports in the wastes are withdrawn. 
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69. I am satisfied that much can be done by the application of efficient roof � 
control measures to eliminate entirely the necessity for firing " cuckoo " :P 
shots. After all, there are whole areas in the country where this practice is !C 
unnecessary even where roof beds are equally as hard as those in areas where the 
practice exists. Strong straight rows of supports applied along the edges of .j' 
wastes and well-built packs of good quality, suitably dimensioned and spaced, ..a: 
would in most, if not all, cases concentrate force sufficient to cause the roof to 
break down in the wastes. Moreover, effective roof control measures may do 
much to control and even reduce the rate of emission of firedamp at or near i'!. 
working faces and also prevent the fonnation of open breaks which often contain 
inflammable gas. Such breaks often communicate with and provide paths for 
draining off accumulations of firedamp in bed·separation cavities and wastes, 
or for the leakage of the air necessary to produce an inflammable mixture in such 
places. Further, with effective roof control there would be less tendency for the 
formation of bed·separation cavities, for the sudden issue or migration of 
accumulations of gas from the waste into the roadways and working faces, 
due to excessive weighting and heflvy falls in wastes, and for uncontrolled 
leakage of air to places where such leakage may be dangeruus. Indeed, quite 
apart from its probable beneficial effect on production, I can think of no other 
matter likely to pay greater dividends in relation to saff'ty in mines generally 
than proper attention to roof control. ':1 
GENERAL 
(f) 0" Ihe Ad,ql/acy oj Ih, Ventilatlot! 
70. Since adequate ventilation is the first and by far the most important 
defence against explosions of inflammable gas, it was not surprising that many 
questions at the Inquiry were directed towards establishing whether or not the 
ventilation was adequate at the time of the explosion. Although it was clearly 
established, as will be evident from the air measurements recorded on Plan 
No. I ,  that there was a considerable drop in the quantity of air reaching the 
working faces in the Six·Quarters Seam as compared with the quantity passing 
in both the main intake and return airways near the shafts, nevertheless there � was no evidence to support any view that the quantity reaching the working 
faces was insufficient to ensure adequate ventilation under normal conditions. 
This conclusion was supported by the few instances where small percentages of 
inflammable gas were detected and recorded by the deputies and also by the 
results of analyses of air samples. I t was also clear, however, that the ventilatioD 
was capable of improvement by a further reduction of leakage, by some 
re-arrangement of the inbye air·circuits and by enlargement of certain airways, . 
and, indeed, work towards effecting improvements in all of these was in actual 
progress at the time. 
71 .  The trouble in this explosion was that the inflammable gas had collected 
in a part of the mine, namely the goaf or waste behind the No. 2 Dip Face. 
and bed·separation cavities associated with that waste, where the gas was 01;lt 
of direct contact with the general ventilation. Consequently, any increase ID 
the quantity of air passing along the No. 2 Dip Face would not have materi� 
changed the condition or lessenc� the .potential danger from this �ccumu�ah� 
of inflammable gas. A reservotr of mflammable gas anywhere m a nune • 
always a potential source of danger ; but it becomes a li,:,ely hazard if i� is !l�' 
or may react upon, a working place. or ncar any poSSible source of Ign,ttloa. 
And in these circumstances it is clear that the more the gas accumulation la 
out of the direct path or sweep of the general air current, the more difficalt 
does it become to take effective steps to guard against the danger from it bf 
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�neans of dired ventilation. In all coal mines where inflammable gas is not 
Jnknown it is therefore incumbent upon all responsible for the management 
to see that, quite apart from any other steps they may take to overcome the 
otential danger, all ignition hazards are eliminated in proximity to wastes l.m1ess it is known that the wastes are free from dangerous accumulations of 
inflammable gas. 
(g) 0" the H.gJ. Death Roll 
72. It will be seen from Appendix Ill, prepared by Dr. A. Roberts, H.M. 
\;\fines Medical Officer for the Northern Region, that forty-five of the victims 
whose bodies were found on the inbye-side of the air-crossing on o. 3 Trunk 
Road, died of carbon monoxide poisoning. None of these bodies showed any 
sign of burning and only onc showed any mark of physical violence-a fractured 
kull, probably sustained after the occurrence of the explosion. These victims 
had all been employed in that part of the workings comprising Skelly's Heading, 
No.2 Rise District and No. 1 Dip off No. 3 Trunk Road. It  is clear that these men 
had not been in an area traversed by flame or subject to serious violence, that 
they must have survived the actual explosion, that they had travelled some 
distance after the event before they were subsequently overcome by the deadly 
afterdamp of the explosion, and that they had a more or less equal chance oC 
survival to the three survivors, Birkett, Hinde and Weighman, who were em­
ployed in the same area of the mine. 
73. \Vhile it  was unfortunate that none of these forty-five men went back 
with the three survivors, nevertheless it is probable that if these men, some of 
whom must certainly have known that an explosion had occurred and who had 
some opportunity to determine their course of action, had been provided with 
a ready means of protection against carbon monoxide, the death roll might well 
have been reduced. It is seldom that the oxygen content of the afterdamp of an 
explosion is so low as to be unable to support life. Largely because of stone­
dusting and more effective ventilation systems, it is a feature of most explosions 
'n recent years that they are les, violent and are confined to smaller areas of the 
it than were the explosions of earlier years, but that, due to the higher 
concentration of men demanded by modern mining, the death roll per unit of 
area covered is larger than fonnerly. Nevertheless, a high proportion of the 
deaths is still due to carbon monoxide poisoning. Following the considerable 
research during recent war years into means of protection against poisonous 
gases, it may be well worth while reconsidering the design o[ self-rescue 
respirators, with a view to providing miners with a more suitable fonn of 
protectio.i1 against an atmosphere containing sufficient oxygen to support life 
but contaminated by carbon monoxide-such as often occurs in the after-damp 
of an explosion-and thus enabling the wearer to reach a place of safety. 
(h) On the Operation and Organisation of Ihe Trained Rescue Brigades 
74. As might be expected in such large-scale operations as took place on this 
casion, where things had to be done and arranged wilh the least possible 
delay, it was not surprising that a careful review of all that happened revealed 
a few weaknesses in the organisation. My object in directing attention to this 
matter is not for the purpose of suggesting that blame attached to anyone-for 
gave of their very best and their conduct was most praiseworthy-but 'with 
a view to effecting improvements in the organisation in future. Two weaknesses 
were the failure to observe the need at an earlier stage in the operations (i) for 
additional Proto Apparatus and instructors trained in its use, with the result 
:that the staff of the local Brigham Rescue Station was overworked and the 




status ; �n� (ii) for a rest for some of the members of the teams whose efficiency i� 
was beglnllIng to be affected by overwork. Further, the accommodation 
available for the large number of rescue men and for the handling of the necessary ;'!t 
equipment was inadequate. One small room was provided for the " Proto " 
and one {or the " Liquid Air " apparatus. This was certainly a fair share of ... _ 
the total available accommodation at the colliery for all purposes, but the 
desirability of providing temporary erections, such as tents or prefabricated 
structures, is well worthy of consideration at such times. 
75. Another weakness was the use of two different types of self-contained 
breathing apparatus. It so happens that the Brigham Rescue Station, in 
common with the majority of Central Rescue Stations in this country, is 
equipped with " Proto " apparatus using compressed oxygen, whereas the .. 
Durham and Northumberland Stations, which supplied many teams, are 
equipped with I f  Liquid Air " a.pparatus. The use of these two different types 
of apparatus was undoubtedly a complication. From the points of v;ew of 
supervision, standardization, efficiency and interchangeability, it is eminently 
desirable that all Central Rescue Stations in a Division should be equipped 
with the same type of apparatus. Experience gained in this disaster also � 
shows the need for the management at every colliery to be pro\;ded beforehand 
with a detailed plan of operations for dealing with any serious emergency that 
may arise at the colliery. 
(i) On the Need to take Special A/ensures to Safeguard Agaillst Explosions 
and Fires 111. the lVhitehaven Group of Collieries 
76. In the light of this explosion and of previous disasters in the collieries 
immediately in and around \Vhitehaven, it is clear that this part of the 
Cumberland Coalfield presents abnormal difficulties and special problems, 
and that additional precautions are called for if the dangers of underground 
explosions and fires are to be surmounted. 
77. There are several adverse factors which affect the safe working of 
collieries in this area where coal has been worked for at least two centuries. 
The collieries are relatively gassy, dry and dusty ; there are extensive areas of 
goaf or waste in many of the seams ; there are several areas sealed off because 
of previous underground fires ; the pits are very " one-sided " because most of 
the districts are working under-sea coal ; many of the working districts are a 
long distance inbye from the shafts ; there are still large areas of distant 
under-sea coal to be worked ; and there is a history of underground fires due 
to the liability of some of the seams to spontaneous combustion. 
78. These adverse factors caU for (i) a high standard of ventilati�n ;  
(ii) adequate dust prevention and suppression measures ; (iii) the eliminatIOD 
as far as practicable of aU possible sources of ignition ; (iv) continuous and 
close supen'ision by responsible officials of all operations on all shifts ; and 
(v) the maintenance of a Iligh standard of discipline. Whilst the need for a!I 
of these is well appreciated by the managements, I am satisfied that there .. 
still room for improvement i.n respect of each of them. History shows that tile 
standards which must be maintained in these matters in the \Vhitehaven pit, 
need to be well above the average. In regard to item (i\'), for some montbt 
prior to the explosion there was no under-manager at \Villiam Pit, due to till 
difficulty of securing a suitable man for the post. But in respect of ercl& 
Whitehaven pit, not only should there be an under-manager, there should alii 
be a responsible official in charge of the mine on shifts when neither tie 
manager nor the under-manager is on duty, who should exercise the respoat 
bilities of, and be not less qualified than, an under-manager. 
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79. There is no doubt whatever that the adverse factors just enumerated 
1150 make the ventilation problem at the \Vhitehaven pits especially difficult. 
They call for the provision of sufficient, well-maintained airways of ample 
limensions ; the elimination of all unnecessary resistance to the passage of air 
�ough the airways ; the judicious splitting of the air current and the careful 
::>alancing of air splits ; comfortable air velocities and reasonable pressures ; 
:lose and constant watch on all development work to ensure not only that 
=fficient and adequate ventilation is provided in the development work, but 
also to see that the balance between the various splits is properly maintained ; 
the elimination of all unnecessary leakage and control of any leakages considered 
necessary ; a " ery high standard of practice in relation to the construction 
and maintenance of doors, sheets, stoppings, etc., because of the high ventilation 
pressure necessitated by long airways ; and last, but not least, the provision of 
efficient means to ensure the circulation of an adequate volume of air throughout 
the workings. Accurate infonnation on most of these factors requires regular 
ventilation surycys for quality, quantity and pressure. Here again, although 
the necessity for all of these things is also appreciated and a high standard is 
maintained in respect of some of these items, nevertheless I feel sure there is 
room for further imprO\'ement in regard to most of them. 
SO. T n my \;ew the whole problem is so important, complex and difficult 
that it cannot properly be left solely to the mining engineers and managers 
responsible for day to day coal production. I am of the opinion that it requires 
the full-time services of a mining engineer, highly qualified in the science and 
practice of mine ventilation, who has also an intimate knowledge of explosion 
and fire hazards. particularly in the \Vhitehaven area. I suggest this specialist 
engineer should be employed not only for the major planning and continuous 
development of the system of ventilation but also that he should have a direct 
responsibility along with the management at each colliery for seeing that the 
plans are properly carried out, and that any tendency to deviate from them is 
immediately checked and corrected. It should also be part of the responsibility 
of the specialist engineer, as well as of the management, to see that all 
practicable steps are taken to eliminate or safeguard against all possible 
explosion or fire risks. And he should be allotted sufficient assistance to 
enable him to carry out his duties efficiently. A prime essential to the success­
ful working of the under-sea coalfield of Cumberiand, and a major problem to 
be solved if success is to be assured, is  the provision and maintenance of 
adequate ,·entilation, for upon this depend the amount of output, the type of 
machinery and the system of mechanisation that can be adopted and, above all, 
the health and safety of the persons employed. No doubt the lessons to be 
learned from past experience at Whitehaven have been carefully noted by those 
now engaged in the planning of new ventures to work the remaining under-sea 
coal in this coalfield. 
VII.-SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
81. Summarising the results of the Inquiry, I consider it established that :-
( 1 )  The explosion originated with the firing of a charge of sheathed 
permitted explosive in a shot-hole drilled in the roof and directed towards 
the waste behind and immediately contiguous to the No. 2 Dip longwall 
machine-cut conveyor face in the Six Quarters Seam. 
(2) Before the shot-hole was charged it had not been examined for breaks 
running along or across, contrary to the requirements of Clause 6 (d) of 
Part TI  of the principal Explosives in Coal Mines Order. 
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(3) The shot-hole passed through a roof break or breaks and the inner end 
of the hole either made contact with, or was in very close proximity to, .. 
a bed-separation cavity containing inflammable gas which was continuous 
with an accumulation of explosive gas in the contiguous waste or goaL 
(4) The firing of the shot ignited the gas in the bed-separation cavity. 
(5) The gas in the cavity burned for a short interval of time and the flame 
travelled along the cavity until i t  reached the explosive mixture in the 
waste, causing a firedamp explosion. 
(6) The flame of the explosion traversed several working faces and nearly 
2,000 yards of roadway, including several inbye conveyor roads, about 60 yards 
of the main return airway and nearly half a mile of the main intake haulage 
road. 
(7) The explosion was marked by few signs of extreme violence. 
(8) The initial explosion was almost certainly one of firedamp only. The 
blast from this initial explosion raised a dust cloud ahead of it and as the 
explosion travelled on its path the nature of the combustible mixture gradually 
changed from firedamp-and-air through firedamp-coal-dust-and-air to 
practically coal-dust-and-air alone, before the flame was finally extinguished 
by excess of stone dust in the dust cloud. 
(9) The excess of coal-dust in the dust cloud was mainly derived from under 
the roadway conveyor structures and from the recently deposited top layer 
along the whole length of the inbye conveyor roads, while the stone dust was 
mainly derived from the main intake haulage road. This stone dust Wa!. 
projected ahead of the coal dust blown from the inbye conveyor roads and 
did not contribute to the extinction of the explosion until the flame had 
travelled nearly half a mile outbye along the haulage road. 
VIII.-RECOMMENDATIONS 
82. The Inquiry has disclosed that certain improvements or changes are 
desirable, and T make the following recommendations :-
(a) SIzol-Firi"g 
( 1 )  In all coal mines where inflammable gas is not unknown, the provision 
of Clause 6 (1) (i) of the principal Explosives in Coal Mines Order, which iD 
effect pennits the firing of shots in close proximity to inaccessible cavines 
or breaks in the gob, goaf or waste, should be strengthened in such manner as 
to restrict the latitude now allowed. 
(2) The firing of that type of shot variously known as " cuckoo ", " upper " 
or " upper-cut ", i.e., a shot fired in the roof near the edge of a waste be� 
a lon�yall face, should be prohibited in mines where pennittcd explosl� 
are required because of possible danger from inflammable gas, except Wltb 
the written authority of the Agent and Manager ; and that before sucb 
authority is granted. the Agent and Manager must satisfy themselves, first!J. 
that it is not reasonable or practicable to break the roof down othe[W1le 
than by shot-firing and, secondly, that the air in the waste does not normally 
contain more than one per cent. of inflammable gas. 
(3) The use of a break detector made to an approved specification, and 
properly maintained, should be made compulsory. 
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(-t) The rna.'Ximum number of shots which it is pennissible for shot-firers 
and deputies, respectively. to fire, should be fixed for each district of the 
mine after a trial made under working conditions, both in respect of the 
number of shots per statutory shift and per hour during the shift, the trials 
to have regard, in the case of a deputy, to his primary responsibility to carry 
out his statutory duties and, in the case of both shot-firers and deputies, 
to any other duties which may be assigned to them or to any assistance given 
to them. 
(5) A thorough investigation should be made by the management of all 
collieries where explosives are used into the whole business of storage, records, 
use and handling of explosives and shot-firing practice in general, including 
hole-boring, with a view to devising the most efficient system appropriate 
to the circumstances, and thereafter a superior official of the mine should 
be given the responsibility of seeing that the approved system is efficiently 
applied and operated in practice. 
(6) Immediate steps should be taken to expedite research work with a 
view to detennining (a) the conditions necessary for ignition when a shot 
is fired in a hole connecting with a break or parting containing inflammable 
gas, and (b) the necessary safeguards against such ignition ; and that, in 
the meantime, wherever permitted explosives are used, the very simple 
practice of pushing a plug of stemming to the back of the hole before it is 
charged should be generally adopted. 
(b) Prccau#ons Against Coal Dust 
(7) In regard to the use of inert dust for neutralizing coal dust on roadways, 
the principle of " little and often ", i.e., the application of small quantities 
at frequent intervals, should be more generally adopted and should be standard 
practice for all roadways in which coal conveyors are used. 
(8) All practicable steps should be taken to prevent or reduce dust formation 
at its source and thereafter to suppress, by water infusion, sprays. wet­
cutting, wet-drilling or other appropriate means. the inflammable dust that 
is inevitably made. 
(c) Rescue and Recovery Work 
(9) Steps should be taken to standardize the type 01 sell-contained breathing 
apparatus provided for the use of Rescue Brigades within each geographical 
Division of the National Coal Board. 
(10) The management at each mine should have in readiness a detailed plan 
which can be operated promptly and effectively in the event of a serious 
emergency arising at the mine. 
( 1 1 )  In view of the number o� lives lost due to carbon monoxide poisoning 
follO\ving recent mine explosions and fires, the question of developing a simple, 
suitable and easily portable mask for the protection of miners against carbon 
monoxide-a subject which has received some consideration in past years­
is well worthy of reconsideration. 
(12) The use of trained dogs to assist in the recovery of missing bodies of 
victims of mine disasters is well worthy of further consideration and trial, 
(d) Appointment oJ Specialist Mt'lIi11g E11gi11ur and Supervisioll by 
Respollsible Officials 
(13) A full-time mining engineer, with an intimate knowledge of mine ex­
plosion and fire hazards and highly qualified in the science and practice of mine 
ventilation, should be appointed for the collieries in the Whitehaven district. 
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His duties should comprise the planning and di rect supervision of the venti­
lation ::;ystem ; the development and application of measures to eliminate or 
safeguard against all explosion and fire risks ; and he should have a definite 
responsibility for these matters along with the managements of the coUierie:5 
concerned. 
( 1 4) In each of the \Vhitehaven collieries, in addition to the Manager and 
Under-manager, there should be a responsible official in charge of the mine 
on shifts when neither the Manager nor the Under-manager is on duty, who 
should he not less qualified than an under-manager. 
IX.-CONCLUDING REMARKS 
(a) Action Taken and Pending 011 the above Recommc1Idatio1ls 
83. I am pleased to report that action has already been taken to implement 
certain of the abo\'e Recommendations, some of which were included in rn,' 
Interim Report presented on 15th October, 19-17. The Explosives in Coal 
Mines Order, 19-18, which was made on -t h February and came into operation 
on the 16th February, covers Recommendations ( l ) ,  (2) and (-l) above. In 
addition, you were pleased to set up a Committee under my Chairmanship and 
representative of all sides of the Industry, to inquire into the precautions 
neces�ary to secure safety in the use of explosi\'es in coal mines, This Committee 
has already begun its labours and will include, among other things, Recom­
mendations (3) and (5) within the scope of its inquiry, Moreover, as a result of 
experience in reeen t mining disasters and following upon Recommendation (6) 
in my Report last year upon the Explosion and Fire at Burngrange Nos. I and � 
(Oil Shale) l\line, Midlothian, the National Coal Board has already set up a 
Committee, with representatives of the Ministry of Fuel and Power as Assessors, 
to report upon the efficient organization of a Mines Rescue Service in each 
Division. This Committee will include within its scope all the above recom­
mendations dealing with Rescue and Recovery 'Vork. Recommendation (11) 
has also been referred to the representative Rescue Advisory Committee of 
the MlI1istry of Fuel and Power. 
(b) A cknow/edgments 
8-1. Finally, I desire to pay tribute to the excellent work done by all who took 
part in the rescue and recovery work and to those who attended to the needs 
of al1 rescue workers when they came out of the pit at all times during several 
days and nights, 1 should also like to express my sincere thanks for the help 
and co-operation given to me by the representatives of all parties to the Inquiry ; 
by Mr. H. afford, Clerk of Court ; by Mr. J.  G. Helps, Area General Manager ; 
by 1\1r. R. \V. Gallantry of the National Coal Board and his staff in the Surveyor's 
Office for the excellent and numerous plans provided ; by 1\1 r. R. J. Edwards. 
H.M. Divisional Inspector of l\lines and his staff ; and by Dr. H. F. Coward and 
members of staff of the Ministry's Safety in Mines Research and Testing Branch. 
, 
I have the honour to be, Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
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25 Pan puller 
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Thomas . .  Pilkington 
Richard Atkinson 
Henry Barker 
Harold John Cm 
WilIiam Pilkington 
John . .  Pilkington 
Dcnnis Lyons 
WiIliam Ronald Musson 
James Murray Bowes 
John josepb Rcnwick 




Thomas fumes Smith 
Thomas Thompson Smith 
I-Ierbcrt Cal"i.n 
Harold Smith 
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4 1  Brusher. 
27 Brushcr. 
28 Pipe Fitter 
34 Face Worker 
2 1  Shift-band 
66 Brusher. 
32 Brushcr. 
3 1  Pan puller. 
22 Brnshcr. 
34 Coal Cutter. 
39 Coal Cutter 
37 Panpullor. · f  Si; Brusher. 
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57 Chock Drawer. 
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24 Brusher. 
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27 Deputy. 
30 Engine Fitter 




37 Airw'ays repairer 
47 Shift-hand. 





5 1  BrusbcT. 




LIST OF WITNESSES 
SamtJ 
I Robert Wilson Gallantn." 
Stephen Ferguson 
. 
3 Frcderick Oliver Smith 
, 
.. Joseph ).lc.\lcavy 
1; Thomas l(ervin 6 Henr" <\lIan 
7 William Hayton McAUister 
S Andrew Roberts 
9 William )[cLaughlin 
Jobn Edwin Birkett 
Daniel Hind!? I 
John James Weighman 
3 William J\nderson Asbbridge 
4 Tbomas Alver Edison Aitken 
:Cl Thomas Edward Nichol!"on 
6 Norman Allan 
I Wilfred Kirk . .  
8 Wilson Graham 
8 Henry Cherry 
'0 
" 
James Doran Lynch 
Thomas H�on 
Vlilliam Anthony Armstrong 
Da "id Coward 
Gregory Ferguson . .  
!5 George Henry Jackson 
�6 William Dockerty . .  
}7 John Arthur �lilligan 
]8 Claude Bernard Meister Platt 
19 George Douglas N ussey 
o William J esse Badg('r 
1 Duncan Davie 
James Bell 
, 3  William Durham 
34 Robert �ocl Forster 
35 Frederick Thomas Hindley 
36 Harold Charlesworth Grimshaw 
37 Frederick V incent TidesweU 
38 Fred Stephenson Wellington Kirk 
39 William Storey . .  
40 J ames CartOD Gallagher 
41 1 van Ceorge Elmer Leek 
42 Charles Clare 
43 Daniel McPherson 
44 ]oseph Ivon Graham 
45 Joseph Garside Helps 





























Superintending Testing Officer. 
H.M. District Inspector of .l\fim.'s. 
H.!\f. Assistant Inspector of Mines. 
J-L\1. Assistant Inspector of :\fincs. 
Inspector of Police. 
Inspector of Police. 
H.M. Assistant Inspector of Mines. 
H.M. Assistant Elcc. Inspector of l\lines. 
Prmcipal Scientific Officer. 




Rescue Apparatus Testing Officer. 
Compressor and Fan Attendant. 
Agent. 
Scientific Advisory Officer, N.C.B. 
Area General Manager. 
Consulting 1\linmg Engineer. 
• 
APPENDIX III 
CAUSES OF DEATH OF 104 MEN KILLED IN WILLIAM PIT GROUPED 









On Inhye side of No. 3 .\IT Crossing 
Main return-between Nos. 2 and 3 
Thirls. 
No. 3 Junction and its immediate 
vicinity. 
No 2 Dip Face 
Near Junction No. 2 Dip Trunk 
Road with Conveyor Road Jeadin� 
to Back-end Shortwall. 
Back-cnd Shortwall Face . .  
Main Return Airway Outbye 










Cause of death 
All CO. Xo. 5 SustalIlOO al 
fractured skull. 
All violence and extensi,-e burns. 
6 Violence + Burns. Xo:.. 52, 
54, 55, 56, 57 and 10!. 
10 CO + Buros. 
24 CO + Burns. I Violence + Bums. Ko. 8.3. 
9 CO + Burns. 
I Violence + Burns. X.a L�. 
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